Hopefully, the IAF does not end up in a situation where with its efforts to re-engine the Jaguar fleet not having fructified, it is compelled to adopt the third option of retiring the fleet prematurely

The request for proposal (RFP) issued on November 26, 2010, for re-engining the threedecade-old 125 aircraft of the Jaguar fleet of the Indian Air Force (IAF) was withdrawn in March this year under orders of the Ministry of Defence (MoD). This somewhat extreme step became necessary in the wake of the withdrawal of Rolls-Royce, one of the two vendors, leaving only Honeywell Aerospace in the race. Apparently, as commercial contracts are not permitted in a “single vendor situation” under the existing provisions of the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP), the government had no other option. And in the prevailing political climate in the country, one ought not to expect any deviation from or ad hoc modification to existing rules and regulations. Tragically, the IAF has literally been left high and dry!

As required under the RFP, Honeywell Aerospace had offered a newly developed engine, the F125 IN. Rolls-Royce on the other hand had offered the Adour 821, which is an upgraded version of the Adour 811, an underpowered engine that currently powers the fleet. Also powering the fleet of Hawk advanced jet trainer fleet of the IAF and the Indian Navy, the Adour 821 is technically not a “new engine” and hence was not “technically compliant”. As it did not meet the terms set out in the RFP, Rolls-Royce opted to withdraw gracefully in time rather than suffer the ignominy of being rejected.

In an interview earlier this year, while commenting on the subject of the abortive $650 million ( Rs. 2,925 crore) contract for new engines for the Jaguar fleet, the Chief of Air Staff (CAS)-designate stated, “This is a temporary phase and the case for reengining is being progressed as per the provisions of DPP.” Although the CAS-designate did not go on to elaborate on the precise steps the IAF was going to take, the options appear to be limited. As is the usual practice in such cases, the IAF will have to go through the tendering process de novo and hope that the exercise does not run aground once again for the same or any other reason. The attendant penalty of course will be delay, eroding further the residual airframe life of the fleet, a situation clearly detrimental to the operational potential of the IAF.