The Author is Former Director General of Information Systems and A Special Forces Veteran, Indian Army

The 'Cold Start' doctrine was developed after India's Operation 'Parakram' in 2002 witnessed slow mobilisation of strike formations, whereas, the requirement was quick deployment of strike formations to achieve surprise and inflict damage before international pressure could mount. The new doctrine was a military strategy designed for rapid, limited conventional attacks into Pakistani territory after a major terrorist incident, aiming to use conventional superiority to achieve political goals without triggering Pakistan's nuclear weapons. The doctrine aimed to punish Pakistan and force it to stop supporting cross-border terrorism, with the captured territory used as a bargaining chip.

The 'Cold Start' doctrine was developed after India's Operation 'Parakram' in 2002 witnessed slow mobilisation of strike formations, whereas, the requirement was quick deployment of strike formations

Key aspects of the Cold Start doctrine included –

• Rapid Mobilisation – the core idea was to drastically reduce the time needed to deploy troops from weeks to days, allowing for a cold start to offensive operations;
• Limited Conventional Attacks - the doctrine did not envision a full-scale invasion but rather shallow, swift incursions to seize and hold a narrow slice of Pakistani territory;
• Below the Nuclear Threshold - attacks were intended to be conventional and limited enough that Pakistan would not see a nuclear response as justified;
• Unified Action - it required the combined efforts of different branches of the military, including the army and air force, operating as integrated battle groups;
• Political Leverage - the territory captured in the attack would serve as a bargaining tool, forcing Pakistan to meet India's demands - ending support for insurgency in J&K;
• Technological Integration – the doctrine relied on modern technology, including information technology, to improve logistics and coordination for faster deployment and execution.

Significantly, Timothy J. Roemer, US Ambassador to India (2009-2011) has raised several questions about the actual application of India's Cold Start doctrine; India's willingness to pursue this option, including not to implementing the doctrine after the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks, all of which has now surfaced in a leaked cable. According to Roemer, India would likely encounter mixed results, the Cold Start is a mixture of myth and reality and that the value of the doctrine to the Indian government may lie more in the plan's existence than in any real-world application. Walter Ladwig, specialising in US foreign policy, opines that a host of factors, including the terrain, the favourable deployment of Pakistani forces, and a lack of strategic surprise in the most likely conflict scenarios, would mitigate whatever mobilisation advantages India may be gaining by its experimentation with Cold Start.

With the operationalisation of the new 'Rudra' Brigade, the Army reportedly plans to upgrade its Cold Start military doctrine to 'Cold Strike' Doctrine

Why India did not strike Pakistan after the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks remains a mystery. One viewpoint is that intelligence intercepts/analysis done during these attacks led Indian planners to believe this was a deliberate attempt by Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) to provoke an Indian military strike on Pakistan, in order to entice other Islamist Pakistani militant groups that were engaged in armed conflict with the Pakistani state to redirect their attacks away from the Pakistani state and unify against India. This assessment was later verified by interrogations and court testimony of David Headley (half Pakistani, half American terrorist) while in US custody. Was this intelligence assessment sane? For that matter, what led India's NSA to personally lead the so-called Pakistani investigation team to the IAF Base at Pathankot, which had been struck by Pakistani terrorists in January 2016?

Over the years, India has been practicing the 'Cold Start' in various exercises. In November 2025, the Indian Armed Forces undertook the Tri Service Exercise 'Trishul'. The broader set of exercises involved Exercise 'Akhand Prahar' between the Indian Army and Air Force. During these exercises, the new 'Rudra' Brigade in the Konark Corps under Southern Command was operationally validated. With the operationalisation of these brigades, the Army reportedly plans to upgrade its Cold Start military doctrine to 'Cold Strike' Doctrine, as reported in the media.

Finally, any doctrine, whether Cold Start or Cold Strike can only deter adversaries when it is physically executed and its efficacy is acknowledged by the adversaries

Force projection and strike options are rehearsed by countries big and small, including China and Pakistan, individually, bilaterally and multilaterally. As for trans-border operations since 2014, India conducted Operation 'Hot Pursuit' deep inside Myanmar (2015), the 'URI surgical strike' in Pakistan (2016) and the stand-off Balakot airstrike (2019). These operations were in retaliation to the large number of casualties suffered by Indian security forces at the hands of Myanmar-based terrorists (in the first instance) and Pakistani terrorists in the latter two cases. In Operation 'Sindoor', our troops did not cross the border into POK/Pakistan. Heavy damage was inflicted on Pakistan, which it is yet to repair, but we also lost IAF jets on the first day for failing to target Pakistan's military assets.

It doesn't appear that Pakistan has learnt its lesson. 122 Pakistani terrorists are presently operating in J&K as per TV news of November 23, 2025. The Delhi and Nowgam blasts proved unambiguous Pakistani connection, but in the security meeting chaired by the Prime Minister, Pakistan was not named. We have said time and again that terror and talks can't go together. But we are talking to Bangladesh despite indications that massive amounts of RDX entered India through Bangladesh, follow up to Pakistani Army Chief Asim Munir having threatened earlier that India will be attacked from the East - through Bangladesh?

Finally, any doctrine, whether Cold Start or Cold Strike can only deter adversaries when it is physically executed and its efficacy is acknowledged by the adversaries. In absence of this, the doctrine remains a theory and nomenclatures don't impress a terrorist country like Pakistan. As of now, Pakistan doesn't seem to have been given the right lesson.