The Author is Former Director General of Information Systems and A Special Forces Veteran, Indian Army

According to the media reports of March 27, 2025, the Indian Army is to permanently deploy a new division, namely 72 Infantry Division, in eastern Ladakh to complement the existing 3 Infantry Division at the Line of Actual Control (LAC). This is part of the restructuring in the Army's Order of Battle (ORBAT). The move comes in view of the heavy deployment of troops on both sides of the LAC. The 72 Infantry Division will be permanently placed under the Leh-based 14 Fire & Fury Corps, which was raised in September 1999 after the Kargil war. The Corps handles some of the most sensitive frontiers and battlefields in the world, with the Siachen Brigade facing both Pakistan and China.

The area that will be under the control of the 72 Infantry Division is currently being taken care of by the Counter Insurgency Force (CIF) Uniform or CIF (U), which was moved as an ad-hoc arrangement to augment the standoff with China. CIF (U) is to move back to its old location in Reasi, Jammu Division, once deployment of 72 Infantry Division is completed. According to news reports, quoting sources, "The headquarters are being raised; one Brigade headquarter is already deployed in Eastern Ladakh and has begun functioning," sources said. The larger elements of the formation are being trained in the western parts of the country "to synchronise the personnel, equipment and organisation as per the specific tasking."

The 72 Infantry Division will be permanently placed under the Leh-based 14 Fire & Fury Corps, which was raised in September 1999 after the Kargil war.

The standoff took place between Chinese and Indian troops in May 2020 at Finger-4 near Pangong Lake, followed by a deadly clash in June in Galwan valley. After several rounds of talks, Indian and Chinese troops resumed patrolling after four years in October 2024. Ambiguity still persists whether Chinese troops withdrew from their position occupied in Y-Junction in the area of Depsang; first in 2013 and then in 2020. However, heavy deployment of troops from both sides continues close to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and there is little chance of the standoff easing because the Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA) has fortified its new positions in 2020.

Whether we want to admit it or not, India's approach to national security has ironically been lackadaisical and the political authorities have been rather fearful of China. If the PLA was forced to withdraw from Nathu La (1967) and Sumdorong Chu (1986-1987), the credit goes to the decision taken by the Indian Army, not by pigeon-hearted politicians. The protective patrols (PPs) established in eastern Ladakh decades back were not even at the LAC recognised by India but much "short" of it – why? Moreover, these PPs were not even permanently occupied and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) patrolling these PPs were deliberately not placed under command of the Indian Army.

The Indian Army had been asking for an additional Infantry Division for eastern Ladakh much before the Kargil war in 1999

77 years after Independence, India still does not have a National Security Strategy (NSS). This is despite the fact that the National Security Advisor (NSA) was officially tasked to define the NSS in 2019. Why this has not happened is obviously because an NSS implies accountability of the politico-bureaucratic caucus. Hence, India has always "reacted" after being faced with critical situations – that too "not always". Eastern Ladakh was the responsibility of the Srinagar-based Corps prior to the 1999 Kargil Conflict. More significantly, eastern Ladakh, with an over 800-km frontage in high altitude, was being looked after by one Division, which also provided troops to man the Northern Glacier on the Saltoro Range. With troops on Northern Glacier turned over every three months, this implied the Division manning eastern Ladakh had two infantry battalions in the Siachen Glacier area.

A little-known fact is that the Indian Army had been asking for an additional Infantry Division for eastern Ladakh much before the massive intrusion made by the Pakistan army in Kargil during 1999. Ironically, no Indian Government (BJP and Congress included) paid any heed. Lack of the politico-bureaucratic interest and understanding of national security requirements is also the reason why raising of the Mountain Strike Corps was approved a decade plus back, raisings commenced but then came the budgetary constraints. 72 Infantry Division is part of the same Mountain Strike Corps – a concept that stands replaced with a new integrated battle group (IBG) concept.

77 years after Independence, India still does not have a National Security Strategy (NSS)

Whether India will make the much-needed change towards national security, remains ambiguous. In the excerpts of his autobiography 'Four Stars of Destiny' (published in the media), General M.M. Naravane (Indian Army Chief in 2020 during the Chinese invasion in eastern Ladakh) writes he was given clear instructions that fire will not be opened on PLA troops. Also, when he telephoned the defence minister seeking orders in a critical situation when PLA tanks were lined up and advancing on our positions, the defence minister responded by saying, "Jo Uchit Samjho Karo" (do as you deem fit).