Clearly, the Obama administration wants to carry forward the momentum nurtured during the George W. Bush years, especially in nuclear and defence cooperation—but the path is strewn with hurdles

Cooperation and contradictions on a wide range of issues left a mixed bag of succour and scepticism in the wake of US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s fourday whirlwind visit to India beginning July 17. On the whole, the message Clinton sought to deliver was clear: the Obama administration wants to carry forward the momentum in bilateral relations gathered and nurtured during the George W. Bush years, especially pertaining to nuclear and defence cooperation. She also indicated the administration’s intention of supporting India “as it readies to play a bigger role in regional and global affairs”.

On the face of it, the real takeaways of Clinton’s visit ostensibly were three major agreements. The first pertains to an ‘end-use monitoring’ legal requirement that allows the US to track arms supplied to another country to ensure these are not sold, or otherwise passed on, to third parties and are being used as per the agreed terms. The second traces out a technical safeguards agreement that will allow India to launch non-commercial satellites containing US components, while a third agreement envisages establishment of a science and technology endowment fund to boost cooperation in these fields.

The joint statement issued by India’s External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna and the visiting US Secretary of State made special mention of the two most important aspects in the field of nuclear and defence cooperation:

Civil Nuclear Cooperation—Building on the success of the India-US Civil Nuclear Initiative, India and the United States will begin consultations on reprocessing arrangements and procedures, as provided in Article 6 (iii) of the 123 Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation between India and the United States.

Defence Cooperation—Noting the enhanced cooperation in defence under the Defence Cooperation Framework Agreement of 2005, both sides reiterated the commitment of their respective Governments to pursue mutually beneficial cooperation in the field of defence—with India’s External Affairs Minister (S.M.) Krishna announcing that both sides had reached agreement on ‘End Use Monitoring’ for US defence articles.

Infused with optimism, ambiguities in the statement nevertheless triggered a volley of questions, with unconvinced political leaders in India raising a dust inside and outside the Parliament. Discontentment was directed largely at the End Use Monitoring Agreement (EUMA), with the Opposition trashing it as ‘sell-out’ of the country’s sovereignty. However, both the landmark pacts warrant close scrutiny.

Under the Defence Cooperation Framework Agreement, India had signed several deals for acquisition of defence equipment from the US, notable among these being the threeaircraft BBJ deal for the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) VIP Communication Squadron and six Hercules C-130Js and eight Poseidon P-8I aircraft for the IAF and Indian Navy, respectively. For all these deals, separate agreements were signed to fulfill Washington’s EUM requirements. It may be recalled that in the case of the BBJs, there was a delay in the delivery of the aircraft on the issue of allowing US inspectors to physically check the aircraft meant for the use of the country’s highest ranking VIPs. Finally, the thorny issue was resolved by allowing the concerned US manufacturer Northrop Grumman of the sensitive onboard equipment to directly deal with the IAF. The novel ‘company-to-company agreement did away with the need for physical verification. It was decided that the US firm would take the responsibility for ‘correct usage’ of the Self-Protection Suit systems, which, in turn, would rely on written assurances tendered by the IAF.

In a bid to do away with the cumbersome case-by-case agreements for end use monitoring, it was decided to prepare a standard text which would cover all of India’s defence deals with the US. Although the exact wording of the standard text has not been made public, concerned defence officials claim while India has agreed to US inspections of military equipment bought from America, the dates and venues for joint security verifications would only be decided through ‘joint consultations’. India has managed to keep ‘physical on-site’ inspections—a touchy subject—out of the draft of the ‘standard text’. In other words, US inspectors will not have carte blanche access to India’s military installations/bases. In actual effect, there is a great possibility that the EUM could be relegated to merely a ‘paper exercise’, without the intrusive physical verification, so long as relations between the two countries remain close and cosy. Consequently, it would be wise for India to employ foresight and prepare a contingency plan to cater to a situation wherein, due to some political or strategic differences, relations between the two countries acquire a degree of chill.

US defence companies have, however, welcomed the announcement on the EUMA as they feel it would boost sales. “The agreement will make it easier to share important US defence technology with India and we look forward to working within the framework of this agreement to support India in modernising its defence forces,” Boeing responded in a statement. “We applaud the signing of the EUMA. This signals an era of increased defence cooperation between the United States and India and we look forward to supporting the requirements of the Indian armed services in partnership with Indian industry,” said Richard Kirkland, South Asia Chief for Lockheed Martin Global. Ron Somers, President of US-India Business Council (USIBC) went further, “Agreement on EUM, besides opening the door to increased defence trade and security cooperation, indicates a high level of trust and cooperation between the US and India.” The USIBC has urged the Indian government to allow Foreign Direct Investment up to 49 per cent in the Indian defence sector.

The second most contentious issue pertains to the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal. While the issue of nuclear tests and consequences thereof remains dormant (or non-issue) due to India’s self-imposed moratorium on such experiments, has the issue of reprocessing of spent fuel raised its ugly head again? At the time of signing the deal, it was India’s offer of a dedicated safeguard facility for reprocessing of spent fuel that had cleared the hurdle for the US to concede reprocessing rights to India. While the safeguards and verification of the facility was to be implemented between India and the International Atomic Energy Agency, the benchmarks were to be set by Washington and Delhi, with full support of the former. Has that situation changed now?