There is an urgent need to address the GROWING ASYMMETRY between the military capabilities of INDIA AND CHINA

A recent statement by the outgoing Chief of the Air Staff about China being the major military threat to India attracted some media attention here but drew little response from the Chinese. This was in contrast to an earlier episode where a similar assertion by an incumbent Defence Minister elicited a sharp rejoinder from China. Two meanings could be derived from this. One, that the Chinese are sensitive to declarations by a minister of the party in power, or two, that given the huge asymmetry between the military capabilities of the two countries tilting in their favour, Beijing can afford to ignore such statements. Whatever be the truth, the growing imbalance in the military power of the two counties should be cause for concern to policy-makers and strategists in India.

Many would attribute this widening capability gap to the stark difference in the type and form of governance that decided procurements in the two countries—China with its doctrinal communist regime and India with its chaotic democracy—but that would be a simplistic conclusion. A more detailed analysis would reveal that the Chinese have been focussed in their approach to national security, whereas India has blundered on without any semblance of long-term vision. It is only recently that the country appears to have got some sort of grip on the direction and action required with regard to national security. The observation that India always arrives at the best solution to any problem, but only after having tried every other method, is only too true about our engagement with national security. Less than three decades ago, India had a navy and air force stronger than China’s. India’s army, too, was better trained, albeit much smaller in sheer numbers. The fiasco of 1962 was a result of poor strategic and tactical planning, mismanagement of military resources and the blunder of not employing the Indian Air Force (IAF). But, since then, the balance of power has shifted dramatically in China’s favour.

Power at Play
China has a time-bound modernisation plan for its military. The plan was operationalised in the early 1990s when Beijing observed the superiority demonstrated by western coalition forces. In comparison, the Chinese military appeared oversized and obsolescent with antiquated equipment and poor levels of training. Fortunately for China, this period coincided with its own economic boom and the collapse of the Soviet Union. China had the money to buy and Russia was willing to sell high-end equipment and weapons for much needed cash. Additionally, many scientists, experts and highly qualified technical personnel, rendered jobless in the collapsing economies of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) were available for hire to give a thrust to the flagging military-industrial complex in China. The modernisation plan envisaged that a solid foundation would be laid by 2010, major progress would be achieved by 2020 and by 2050, China would accomplish its strategic goal of building an ‘informatised’ (net-centric warfare enabled) armed forces capable of winning wars. Perhaps the unstated objective of the plan was to expand China’s ‘comprehensive national power’ beyond the existing regional status.

Consequently, China invested heavily in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which comprises the PLA Ground Forces, the PLA Navy (PLAN), the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), the Second Artillery Corps (for strategic and nuclear weapons and other missiles) and the PLA Reserve Force. Currently, the PLA has 2.20 million personnel on active duty with another 800,000 in reserve. Additionally, there are approximately four million personnel in the paramilitary units, bringing the overall strength to more than seven million. In comparison, India has 1.3 million on active duty in its armed forces with 1.1 million in reserve and an additional 1.3 million in the paramilitary units, bringing the total to 3.7 million.

Further, in China, military service is compulsory for all men above 18 years with women permitted in medical, veterinary and technical services. Rapid economic progress has also permitted China to exponentially increase its military budget. Its annual military budget for 2006 was $35 billion (Rs 1,68,560 crore) which increased to $60 billion (Rs 2,88,905 crore) by 2008. These are figures admitted by the Chinese. Foreign analysts are of the opinion that much of the military expenditure remains hidden. According to them, China’s defence budget is anywhere between $100 billion (Rs 4,81,656 crore) to $140 billion (Rs 6,74,320 crore).

Large investments are being made in high-end asymmetric military capabilities that include electronic and cyber warfare, counter-space operations, Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles, Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles and cruise missiles, advanced integrated air defence (AD) systems, torpedoes, advanced submarines capable of carrying Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) and unmanned aerial vehicles. The emphasis has shifted from PLA Ground Forces to PLAN and the PLAAF in keeping with China’s quest for power projection and joint operations.

Dominance on land, at SEA, in AIR
China tested its first atomic bomb in 1964 and launched its first nuclear missile two years later. Since then China has made steady progress in this field and by 1986 had a credible minimum deterrent force with land, sea and air elements. Today, China has a large arsenal of nuclear weapons capable of hitting targets over most of the world. Systems being developed and operationalised like the DF-31, DF-31A and the JL-2 will give China a more survivable nuclear force. China has constructed a huge underground nuclear submarine base at Hainan reportedly capable of holding 20 submarines in shelters dug into the hillside. China has also helped Pakistan develop the Arabian Sea port of Gwadar, with the intention of using it for logistic support to Chinese ships. This effectively increases the footprint of PLAN greatly, while also affording protection to the sea lines of communication (SLOC).

The PLAN has approximately 250,000 personnel to support 77 main warships, 88 amphibious warships, 65 submarines and more than 500 other vessels comprising coastal warships, anti-mine ships, landing crafts and support ships. The PLAN is transforming itself into a blue water navy with extended reach. Anti-access and area denial will be key objectives of the force. China is building its own aircraft carriers and is in the process of replacing many old or obsolescent vessels with modern destroyers with latest AD weapons and anti-ship missiles, nuclear-powered submarines with SLBMs, conventional attack submarines and large ships for troop transportation. The PLAN will become a crucial instrument of coercion or defence in the South China Sea which has the Spratley Islands and the Paracel Islands, the ownership of both being disputed. The Spratley group of islands is claimed by China, Brunei, Malaysia, The Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam. The Paracel Islands has claimers in China, Taiwan and Vietnam. Both the island groups are energy rich. Additionally, most of the crude oil requirements of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are carried through the SLOC of South China Sea.

For precisely this reason, among others, modernisation plans for the PLAAF are geared to transform it into a modern air force capable of long range precision strike and strategic reach. From humble beginnings, the PLAAF slowly developed with Soviet assistance, that included helping China build its own versions of Soviet aircraft, like the J-2 (MiG-15), J-4 (MiG-17) and J-6 (MiG-19). Rupture of relations with the Soviet Union in 1960 resulted in the collapse of the Chinese aircraft industry with degrading effect on the PLAAF. The decline continued till about 1965, a fact Indian intelligence failed to convey to the political leaders, resulting in a much stronger IAF not being allowed to participate in an offensive role during the 1962 war.