During an interaction with the media on December 30, 2014, there was a statement made by Manohar Parrikar, the Minister of Defence, that there were complications with the French aerospace major Dassault in the negotiations for the Rafale medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) for the Indian Air Force (IAF). Presenting Plan B for the IAF, the Defence Minister stated that if for any reason, it was finally decided not to procure the Rafale, the IAF could order additional numbers of the Su-30MKI that was good enough to meet with the requirements. Strangely enough, earlier in December in a meeting at Delhi, Defence Minister Parrikar had assured the French Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian, that negotiations for the Rafale would be placed on fast track. The most recent statement would have certainly created a serious dilemma for the planners in the IAF and dismay across its rank and file.

The exercise at Air HQ to procure the MMRCA began in the beginning of the last decade as a proposal for 126 light-weight fighter aircraft of 15 to 20 tonnes weight essentially for the air defence role. Dubbed initially as the multi-role combat aircraft (MRCA), the new acquisition was required to replace the air defence version of the MiG-21. Acquired in the early 1960s, this part of the MiG-21 fleet was fast approaching the end of its total technical life and would have to be phased out in the near future. The requirement had also acquired urgency as the time frame for the availability of the light combat aircraft Tejas, designed and developed by the Indian aerospace major the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), could not be predicted with any degree of certainty. The staff qualitative requirements for the MRCA were subsequently revised, weight criteria raised to 25 to 30 tonnes and the aircraft re-designated as the MMRCA. The request for proposal (RFP) in accordance to the newly crafted Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) was issued in 2007, six years after the proposal was initiated at Air HQ.

After an elaborate technical and flight evaluation as also scrutiny of commercial bids, it was only on January 31, 2012, that the Rafale was finally declared as the most suitable platform from amongst the six contenders that had offered their bids against the RFP issued four-and-a-half years earlier. Three years have gone by since Dassault was declared as the winner in the race for the contract and it has been seven years since the tender was floated, but the original equipment manufacturer and the IAF continue to be plagued with uncertainty about the award of contract. The situation is rendered particularly grave as owing to retirement of the MiG-21, MiG-23 and MiG-27 fleets, the strength of combat aircraft squadrons has further dwindled and as revealed in the Parliament in the recent past, now stands at 25 as against the currently authorised strength of 39.5 squadrons and the newly sanctioned level of 42 squadrons to be attained by 2022. An abortive RFP for the MMRCA after 14 years of struggle by Air HQ and the OEM will be an unmitigated disaster for both. Plan B as suggested by the Minister of Defence, of ordering additional Su-30MKI aircraft, though seemingly expedient at this point in time, may not be the most appropriate solution for retaining the operational edge the IAF needs to maintain over its adversaries.

Procurement of military hardware through the DPP has indeed been a frustrating experience for the armed forces as tenders for urgently required equipment, more often than not, have run aground impinging on operational capability of the armed forces and on the credibility of the system of defence procurement itself. The tender for 197 light utility helicopters (LUH) for the Indian Army and the IAF floated in 2004 was cancelled in 2007 on account of allegations of wrongdoing. A fresh tender floated in 2008 was also cancelled in 2014 for similar reasons. The proposal for import of the LUH has finally been scrapped and the responsibility of providing this platform has been assigned to HAL, leaving the armed forces in a state of complete uncertainty about the time frame for the availability for this urgently needed machine. Tenders floated for the acquisition of artillery guns have been cancelled five times. Efforts by the IAF to procure engines for the upgrade of the Jaguar have also proved to be frustrating. But the most embarrassing episode has been the cancellation of the contract for AW-101 helicopters from AgustaWestland for VVIP travel. In this case, the contract was cancelled midway through execution leaving the IAF with no option but to divert part of the operational fleet of MI-17V5 helicopters for this task.

Unless the Ministry of Defence restructures the DPP urgently to be responsive to the imperatives of national security, the process of procurement of military hardware by India will no longer enjoy any credibility on the global scene.