In the absence of genuine, complete and meaningful integration of the Service Headquarters with the MoD, it is doubtful whether India’s aspirations to emerge as a power to reckon with in either regional or the global scenario can ever be fulfilled

One of last things that Chief of the Air Staff Air Chief Marshal P.V. Naik did as the Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee before remitting office on July 31, 2011, was that he shot off an epistle to the Prime Minister about “the lack of integration between the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the three Services.” He is reported to have stated that “this was contributing to prolonged delays in procurement and hampering other higher defence management activities.”

The problem of lack of integration between the Armed Forces Headquarters and the politico-bureaucratic establishment of the government in power is age-old and not uncommon in many other democracies in the world. The phenomenon is therefore in no way unique to India. For the Armed Forces Headquarters of India, even petty and trivial issues invariably precipitate into a virtual battle with the MoD which is perhaps as intense as it would possibly be with the enemy. While a conflict with the latter has the potential to bring honour and fame to the armed forces, a confrontation with the MoD is invariably ungainly and more often than not, takes an ugly turn leading to nothing but all-round embarrassment. With overriding powers, the politico-bureaucratic establishment has the final say and usually have their way leaving the Armed Forces Headquarters with bruised ego and smarting under insult and perception of injustice. The most recent controversy over the date of birth of the serving Chief of Army Staff is eloquent commentary of the levels to which the equation between the MoD and the Armed Forces Headquarters have descended to. The final outcome of this inelegant affair is unlikely to be different.

But the issue of lack of integration of the Service Headquarters with the MoD has serious implications for national security. Modern warfare requires not only a high level of synergy amongst the three wings of the armed forces but also their total integration with the politico-bureaucratic establishment as well. The Service Headquarters must be an integral part of the structure responsible for decision-making and ought to be involved with the process from the word go. They should not be kept at arm’s length as has rather unfortunately been the trend so far. The Kargil Review Committee was appointed by the government after the conflict in 1999 to delve into these very issues. The Committee had recommended the appointment of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) for better cohesion and coordination amongst the three Services as also the integration of the three Service Headquarters with the MoD. These recommendations were duly endorsed by a Group of Ministers. However, though more than a decade has gone by, the recommendations of the Committee which ostensibly was a matter of high priority for the government has been implemented neither in letter nor spirit. Changes made so far have largely been cosmetic in nature such as the adoption of the “single file system” and the somewhat perfunctory re-designation of the Army and Naval Headquarters as “Integrated Headquarters of MoD”. Strangely, the Indian Air Force Headquarters continues to retain its old nomenclature. Besides, the possibility of the appointment of a CDS is as remote today as ever and the Service Headquarters at best have only a peripheral role to play in the decision-making process. Over the years since independence, status of the armed forces have been progressively lowered perhaps in keeping with the Nehruvian philosophy of the Indian Army being quite dispensable as India could well manage its security with a police force.